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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
CONTINUOUS USE . The disputed land included 31
acres erroneously included in the plaintiff's land by
surveyors. The plaintiff presented evidence of some use of
the disputed land as pasture and claimed a fence on the
defendant's side of the disputed land was the boundary. The
court held that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient hostile
use to demonstrate adverse possession as a matter of law
because the plaintiff failed to show continuous use of the
disputed land and failed to show that the fence was
adequately maintained to as to completely separate the
disputed land from the defendant's land. Wall v. Carrell,
894 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor filed a motion to
avoid a judgment lien against the debtor's homestead. The
debtor had filed an exemption for the homestead in the
amount of $40,000 although Mont. Code § 70-32-104
allowed only an exemption of $20,000. However, no timely
objections were filed. The court held that for avoidance
purposes, the debtor was limited to the exemption amount
the debtor "could claim;" therefore, the debtor could avoid
judgment liens only to the extent the lien impaired the
$20,000 statutory limit. In re Moe, 179 B.R. 654 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1995).
HOMESTEAD.  The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption for the debtor's $39,000 of equity in the
homestead. The Chapter 7 trustee objected to the exemption
because there existed $36,000 of pre-homestead claims in
the case. The trustee argued that the trustee had the authority
to object to the exemption under either Section 544(b) or as
a representative of the estate. The court held that Section
544(b) did not apply because there was no transfer by the
debtor to avoid by the trustee; however, the court held that
the trustee did have the authority to object to the exemption
on behalf of the pre-homestead creditors. The court also
held that the debtor could not claim a homestead exemption
except to the extent the equity in the homestead exceeded
the pre-homestead claims filed in the case. In re Rye, 179
B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).
IRA. The debtor claimed the funds in an IRA as exempt
under N.J. Stat. § 25:2-1. The trustee argued that the IRA
was eligible for the exemption because the IRA funds wee
not rolled over from an ERISA qualified plan and the debtor
had unrestricted access to the funds. The court held that the
IRA was eligible for the exemption because the state
exemption did not require that the funds be derived from an
ERISA qualified plan or that the debtor's access to the funds
be restricted. In re Lamb, 179 B.R. 419 (Bankr. D. N.J.
1994).
    CHAPTER 11   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN. The debtor operated a retail garden shop and
nursery. The Chapter 11 plan provided that the debtor would
retain the business property and included the property at its
liquidation value, thus stripping down the secured claims to
the liquidation value. The court held that the property had to
be included at its fair market value because the debtor had
no intention of selling the property and would continue to
receive income from the property. In re Winthrop Old
Farm Nurseries, Inc., 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CONVERSION. The Chapter 7 debtor operated an
exotic animal farm in which the debtors raised animals
belonging to other investors in return for a partial ownership
in the animals. The Chapter 7 trustee had filed a motion to
reject the animal raising contracts because of the high
expenses, the declining market for such animals and the
debtors' interference with the trustee's operation of the
business. The debtors then filed a motion to convert the case
to Chapter 12. The debtors argued that they had an absolute
right to convert the case at any time absent fraud. The
debtors' argument was based on the legislative history of
Section 706(a) in which the Senate committee report
referred to the "absolute right" to convert a case. The court
held that a Chapter 7 debtor did not have an absolute right to
convert to Chapter 12 because the statute and legislative
history provided exceptions to the conversion right. The
court also held that conversion would be denied because the
debtors' contracts to raise the animals could be rejected by
the trustee based on the losses incurred by the estate and the
debtors' actions impairing the operation of the business. In
re Starkey, 179 B.R. 687 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ALLOCATION OF PAYMENTS FOR TAXES. The
debtors' business suffered losses from embezzlement by the
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manager of their business. Some of the funds embezzled
were to be paid for federal employment taxes. Although the
debtors made sufficient payments over the next three years
to satisfy all employment taxes, the payments were made
late and applied by the IRS to previous periods such that the
penalties accrued caused an eventual deficiency assessed
against the debtors personally. The debtors argued that some
of the payment should have been allocated to current tax
obligations to prevent further penalties. The court held that
the IRS could not reallocate payments if (1) the payments
were designated by the debtors for a particular period, (2)
the payments were made with a return for a particular
period, or (3) the payments were made by deposit.
Undesignated payments or payments made in excess of a
current obligation could be allocated by the IRS. Matter of
Ledin, 179 B.R. 721 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors had entered into a
pre-petition closing agreement with the IRS which
converted partnership tax items into nonpartnership items
and initiated, under I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1), the one year
limitation period for assessments based on the closing
agreement to apply to the items. The debtors, however, filed
for bankruptcy before the IRS could make an assessment
and the debtors sought to avoid the IRS claim based on the
closing agreement because the assessment was made
postpetition without first obtaining relief from the automatic
stay. The court held that the assessment did violate the stay
and that the assessment period was not tolled by the filing of
the bankruptcy case. However, the court held that it had the
authority to retroactively grant relief from the automatic
stay and that such relief was allowed in this case because the
IRS would lose its claim if relief was not granted and the
relief would have been granted if the IRS had timely applied
for relief from the stay. The court also noted that the debtor
would not be harmed by the granting of the relief because
the whole situation arose because the debtor had accepted
the closing agreement as a settlement of the taxes owed. In
re Silvering, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995).
The debtors filed for Chapter 13 in February 1994 and
filed their federal income tax returns in August 1994,
claiming a refund. The Chapter 13 plan provided for full
payment of back taxes owed by the debtors and the plan was
confirmed. After the confirmation, the IRS filed for relief
from the automatic stay to effect a setoff of the refund
against the taxes owed by the debtors. The debtors argued
that no setoff was allowed after confirmation of a plan
which provided for full payment of the IRS claim and that
refusal to pay the refund was a violation of the automatic
stay. The court held that the setoff met all of the
requirements of Section 553(a) and that confirmation of the
plan had no effect on the IRS right of setoff. The court
granted the relief from the automatic stay. In re Tillery, 179
B.R. 576 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995); In re Warwick, 179
B.R. 582 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS had filed a lien against
the debtor's property. The debtor filed for Chapter 13 and
the IRS claim was scheduled but the IRS did not file a
claim. The Chapter 13 plan was confirmed. The debtor
sought to avoid the IRS lien as against the debtor's
homestead exemption to the extent the lien was unsecured.
The IRS argued that under Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410
(1992), the lien could not be avoided because it was not
disallowed in the case. The court held that Dewsnup did not
apply to Chapter 13 cases and held that the tax lien was
avoided to the extent that the lien exceeded the debtor's
equity in the homestead. In re Hendrix, 179 B.R. 519
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The IRS sought to have the debtor's
taxes for 1981 and 1982 declared nondischargeable for
failure to file tax returns. The debtor testified that the debtor
had cooperated with the IRS in collection efforts for those
years and had signed a document which contained the IRS
calculations as to the tax owed for those years. The IRS
claimed to not have any such document and presented only
a computer printout of collection and assessments made.
The court held that the IRS had the burden of proving
nondischargeability of the taxes and held that the debtor's
testimony was credible and sufficient to require the IRS to
demonstrate that the debtor had not signed a substitute
return for 1981 and 1982. Matter of Gless, 179 B.R. 646
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
TAX LIEN. The Chapter 7 trustee had applied to the
Bankruptcy Court for permission to hire a real estate broker
who had a client who wanted to purchase estate property.
The application was approved to the extent that the
prospective client did purchase the property. The client
purchased the property. Before the payment of the
commission was finally approved, the IRS levied the trustee
for payment of the commission in order to collect on taxes
owed by the real estate broker. The trustee refused to pay
the commission to the IRS because the fee payment had not
been finally approved by the Bankruptcy Court. The court
ruled that the fee was subject to the levy because there were
no facts or reasons why the fee would not have been paid;
therefore, the trustee was personally liable for failure to pay
the commission to the IRS under the levy. United States v.
Ruff, 179 B.R. 967 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations changing Nebraska from a Class A to a Class
Free state. 60 Fed. Reg. 28322 (May 31, 1995).
See proposed regulations under Tuberculosis, infra.
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued interim
regulations adding a noninsured crop disaster assistance
program to protect producers of crops for which insurance is
not available. 60 Fed. Reg. 26669 (May 18, 1995).
PEANUTS. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
establishing the 1995 quota peanuts average support level of
$678.36 per short ton, the national average support level for
additional peanuts at $132 per short ton, and the minimum
CCC export edible sale price for additional peanuts at $400
per short ton. 60 Fed. Reg. 27868 (May 26, 1995).
TOBACCO. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
establishing the 1995 marketing quota for burley tobacco at
549 million pounds and the 1995 price support level at
172.5 cents per pound. 60 Fed. Reg. 27867 (May 26, 1995).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations requiring the branding of tuberculosis and
brucellosis reator and exposed cattle and bison on the hip
instead of on the jaw. The proposed regulations also allow
the interstate movement to slaughter of reactor and exposed
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animals if the animals are moved in the presence of an
APHIS or state representative or are moved in vehicles




CLOSING LETTERS. After an examination of the
estate's tax returns, the IRS issued an Estate Tax Closing
Letter; however, the letter stated that it did not constitute a
formal closing agreement. The IRS later reopened the
examination of the returns and assessed a deficiency, giving
the reason for reopening the case as so to avoid a "serious
administrative omission." The court held that the reopening
of the case was allowed and was not an abuse of discretion.
Estate of Bommer v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-197.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].*  A trust was established in 1934 for the benefit of
the taxpayer. The trust granted the taxpayer a testamentary
general power of appointment over one third of the trust or a
testamentary limited power of appointment over the whole
trust. The taxpayer disclaimed the general power of
appointment and executed a will which exercised the limited
power of appointment in favor of the taxpayer's children.
The IRS ruled that the release of the general power of
appointment did not subject the trust to GSTT and the
exercise of the limited power of appointment would not
subject the trust to GSTT since the exercise did not extend
the life of the trust past 21 years after a life in being at the
formation of the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9519009, Feb. 2, 1995.
The decedent's will provided for a nonmarital trust of
property equal in value to the unified credit and a marital
trust for the surviving spouse. The trustee, pursuant to
authority under state law, divided the marital trust into a
QTIP trust and a non-QTIP trust, for the purpose of making
a reverse QTIP election, and further divided each of those
trusts into trusts with one grandchild each as remainder
holder. The IRS ruled that the grandchild trusts would be
considered a separate trust for purposes of GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9519050, Feb. 14, 1995.
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.* The decedent’s estate
included property in which the decedent had received a life
interest from the estate of the decedent’s predeceased
spouse and for which the predeceased spouse’s estate had
claimed as QTIP. The decedent’s estate excluded the QTIP
property, arguing that the property was not eligible QTIP
because the trustee had discretion as to how often to make
distributions. The Tax Court found that the trust required
reasonable distributions, which the court interpreted as at
least quarterly distributions.  The Tax Court also held that
the estate was improperly attempting to revoke the
irrevocable QTIP election. The appellate court affirmed
based on the first holding of the Tax Court. Est. of
Cavenaugh v. Comm’r, 51 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'g
on point, 100 T.C. 407 (1993).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* Under the
decedent’s will, certain assets passed to the surviving spouse
in trust with the remainder of the estate and the remainder of
the trust passing to the decedent’s daughter.  In order to
avoid problems with administering the trust, the spouse and
daughter reached a settlement which provided for one-half
of the estate to pass outright to each party. The estate
claimed a marital deduction for the portion passing to the
spouse. The court held that the surviving spouse’s interest in
the trust was not QTIP because the will provided the spouse
with no power to appoint the interest in the trust to only the
spouse or the spouse’s estate. The court held that because
the surviving spouse’s enforceable interest in the trust did
not qualify as QTIP, the amount passing under the
settlement could not qualify for the marital deduction. Est.
of Carpenter v. Comm’r, 95-1 U.S Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,194 (4th Cir. 1995), aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1994-108.
The decedent’s 1978 will bequeathed an amount of the
estate to a marital trust equal to the “maximum allowable
marital deduction.” The decedent died in 1983 without
changing the will. In 1987, Tennessee passed a statute
allowing such bequests to qualify for the unlimited marital
deduction if a state probate court determined that to be the
intention of the decedent. The court held that the statute was
insufficient to qualify the bequest, under the transitional rule
of Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (ERTA), for the
unlimited marital deduction because the statute itself did not
construe the bequest, but allowed a court to do the
construing. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
Tennessee statute was sufficient to comply with the
transitional rule of ERTA even though the statute would
allow different results for similar estates. Hall v. U.S., 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,183 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g and
rem'g, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,135 (M.D. Tenn.
1993).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
taxpayer owned special use valuation property received
from a decedent less than 10 years ago.  The taxpayer
transferred the property to a revocable trust for the taxpayer
with a remainder to the taxpayer's spouse. The taxpayer was
to receive all income from the trust and had the power at
any time to revoke the trust and receive all trust property.
The IRS ruled that the special use valuation benefits would
not be recaptured because of the transfer of the property to
the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9519015, Feb. 7, 1995.
VALUATION. The decedent owned varying interests in
five corporations. Four of the corporations merely owned
assets, such as trucks, real property or equipment which
were leased to one corporation. The court held that the value
of the decedent's stock in those corporations was to be based
on the fair market value of the assets held by the
corporations because the assets were fully depreciated and
were held for investment and not used in a trade or business
of the corporations. The value of the decedent's stock was
discounted for lack of marketability and for minority
interests. Estate of Ford v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,196 (8th Cir. 1995).
The taxpayer established a 10-year irrevocable trust for
the taxpayer funded with S corporation stock. The trust
provided an annual annuity of a percentage of the fair
market value of the trust assets to be paid to the taxpayer on
the anniversary of the creation of the trust. If the taxpayer
died before the trust terminated, the trust assets were to be
paid to the taxpayer's estate. At the end of ten years, the
trust assets passed to taxpayer's children. The IRS ruled that
(1) the taxpayer would be considered the owner of the trust
if the value of the taxpayer's reversionary interest exceeded
5 percent of the value of all trust assets, (2) no gain or loss
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would be recognized from contribution of S corporation
stock to the trust, (3) the trust was a QSST, (4) the
taxpayer's interest in the trust was a qualified annuity
interest under I.R.C. § 2702(b) such that the value of the gift
to the children would be the fair market value of the
property transferred to the trust less the value of the
taxpayer's annuity interest, (5) payment of the annuity
amount on the anniversary date with no proration during the
first taxable year did not disqualify the annuity interest
under Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b), and (6) if the taxpayer
survives the term of the trust, the property in the trust would
not be included in the taxpayer's gross estate. Ltr. Rul.
9519029, Feb. 10, 1995.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C  CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer was the
sole shareholder of a corporation and made withdrawals of
cash from the corporation which were used to buy personal
property and for personal expenses. The court held that the
withdrawals were constructive dividends and not loans
because the withdrawals had no date for repayment and the
taxpayer forgave a portion of the withdrawals as bonuses
each year, showing an intent not to repay the withdrawals.
Tahamtan v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-226.
The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a corporation
which made payments on the taxpayer's credit card accounts
and a bank loan. The court held that the credit card
payments were constructive dividends because the credit
card was used to purchase the shareholder's personal items.
The payments made to the bank were not constructive
dividends because the payments were made in satisfaction
of the corporation's bona fide obligation to the shareholder.
Reis v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1995-231.
CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME. The taxpayers, husband
and wife, claimed all of the interest on their home mortgage
as a personal deduction. However, a portion of the mortgage
payments were made by a corporation owned by the
taxpayers, although the corporation payments were not
included by the taxpayers in their gross income. The
taxpayers argued that they contributed personal funds to the
corporation checking account from which the payments
were made. The court held that the corporation payments
were included in the taxpayers' gross income because the
taxpayer provided no evidence of an intent to repay the
corporation for the mortgage payments. Upper v. U.S., 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,257 (D. N.J. 1995).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer had brought a state court action for
misrepresentation and breach of contract by the purchaser of
the taxpayer’s business. The parties settled with a payment
to the taxpayer. The court held that the damages allocable to
the misrepresentation claim were excludible from taxable
income as tort damages, but that the breach of contract
damages were not excludible. The appellate decision is
designated as not for publication. Fitts v. Comm’r, 95-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,254 (8th Cir. 1995), aff'g, T.C.
Memo. 1994-52.
The taxpayer had filed a suit against a former employer
for violations of the Employee Retirement and Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The taxpayer prevailed on
the suit and a Special Master was appointed to determine the
damage award. Based on the belief that extracontractual and
punitive damages were awardable in ERISA actions, the
Special Master characterized a portion of the settlement as
for "dignitary injuries." The taxpayer excluded this portion
of the settlement from gross income as relating to a "tort-
like" action. The court held that extracontractual and
punitive damages were not allowed in ERISA actions,
therefore, no portion of the settlement could be excluded
from gross income because ERISA did not provide any tort-
like cause of action.  Dotson v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,258 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
DEPRECIATION-ALM §4.03[4].*  The IRS has issued
a safe harbor for the definition of demolition of a structure
under I.R.C. § 280B. Under Section 280B, the costs of
demolition of a building must be capitalized in the cost of
the land on which the building stood. Under the safe harbor,
the modification of a building will not be considered a
demolition if (1) 75 percent or more of the existing external
walls remain in place as external or internal walls and (2) 75
percent of the existing internal structural framework remain
in place. Rev. Proc. 95-27, I.R.B. 1995-23.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].*  The taxpayer
claimed deductions for expenses relating to a goat raising
activity. The court held that the deductions were not allowed
because the goat raising business was not entered into with
the intent to make a profit since the activity was not
conducted in a business-like manner. The appellate court
affirmed but noted that the Tax Court's requirement that the
taxpayer have an ultimate goal of realizing a profit to offset
early losses is too broad a standard. The appellate decision
is designated as not for publication. Keller v. Comm’r, 95-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,250 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g,
T.C. Memo. 1993-415.
INTEREST. The taxpayer was a corporation which
grew timber and manufactured paper products. The
corporation sold some of its stock to a third party and the
sale contract provided for "interest" on the sale price for the
period between the contract and the closing date which
could not occur until ICC approval was obtained. The
corporation treated this "interest" as part of the purchase
price included in long term capital gain on the stock. The
IRS argued that the "interest" was taxable as interest and
thus was ordinary income. The court held that the "interest"
was part of the purchase price included in the long term gain
because the purchaser could withdraw from the contract
before closing and did not acquire title to the stock before
closing. International Paper Co v. U.S., 95-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,246 (Fed. Cls. 1995).
JURISDICTION. The taxpayer had applied to the IRS
for abatement of interest on tax deficiencies because of
delay caused by a criminal investigation. The IRS denied
the application and the taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court for
review of the IRS decision. The court held that the Tax
Court did not have jurisdiction to review the IRS decision.
Melin v. Comm'r, 95-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,265
(7th Cir. 1995).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIABILITIES. Two persons formed a partnership with
one person contributing depreciable property subject to a
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nonrecourse liability of $6,000, a book value of $10,000 and
an adjusted basis of $4,000. The other person contributed
$4,000 in cash. The IRS ruled that the partnership had
$6,000 of I.R.C. § 704(c) built-in gain from the depreciable
property and the contributing partner's share of the
nonrecourse liabilities was to be determined under Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-3. Under Section 1.752-3(a)(1), the partners do
not receive an allocation of nonrecourse liabilities because
the book value exceeded the nonrecourse liability
immediately after the contribution of the property. Under
Section 1.752-3(a)(2), the nonrecourse liabilities are
allocated as provided by I.R.C. § 704(c) as if the property
was sold by the partnership in exchange only for assumption
of the liability. In this case, such a transaction would result
in $2,000 of taxable gain which would be allocated to the
contributing partner and $4,000 of book loss, $2,000 of
which would be allocated to each partner, if the partnership
used the traditional method of making Section 704(c)
allocations. If the partnership used the remedial allocation
method of Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(d), the partnership would
make a remedial allocation of $2,000 tax loss to the
noncontributing partner and a remedial allocation of tax
gain to the contributing partner; thus, the contributing
partner would be allocated $4,000 of the nonrecourse
liabilities. If the partnership used the curative allocation
method of Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(c), the contributing partner
would be allocated $2,000 of the nonrecourse liability. The
excess nonrecourse liabilities are allocated under one of the
alternatives of Section 1.752-3(c). Rev. Rul. 95-41, I.R.B.
1995-37.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayers
formed a limited liability company under the Texas Limited
Liability Act. The Act provides that an LLC is dissolved
upon the death, expulsion, withdrawal, bankruptcy or
dissolution of a member or other terminating event, unless
there is at least one remaining member and a number of the
remaining members, as established by the LLC agreement,
vote to continue the LLC. The Act also prohibited the
assignment or transfer of an LLC interest unless allowed by
the LLC agreement. The IRS ruled that the LLC would be a
partnership under the I.R.C. Ltr. Rul. 9520036, Feb. 17,
1995.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in May 1995,
the weighted average is 7.29 percent with the permissible
range of 6.56 to 7.95 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable
range) and 6.56 to 8.02 percent (90 to 110  percent
permissable range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 95-32,
I.R.B. 1995-22, 6.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
BUILT-IN GAIN. The taxpayer was a C corporation
which had merged into an S corporation. The C corporation
assets included growing timber. The IRS ruled that the
income derived from the cutting of timber and the sale of
the logs during the recognition period (10 years from the
date of the election) would not constitute recognized built-in
gain if the timber is cut during the recognition period. The
sale of logs cut before the recognition period and sold
during the recognition period would produce built-in gain.
Ltr. Rul. 9519024, Feb. 9, 1995; Ltr. Rul. 9520044, Feb.
21, 1995.
ONE CLASS OF STOCK. An S corporation had one
person and two qualified trusts as shareholders. From 1987
through 1991, the corporation made distributions to the
shareholders which varied from the proportional interests of
the shareholders in order to assist the shareholders in
making federal income tax payments resulting from their
share of corporation income. The disproportionate
distributions were adjusted in 1994 to equalize the
cumulative amount of per share distributions. The IRS ruled
that the corporation did not create a second class of stock.
Ltr. Rul. 9519035, Feb. 14, 1995.
An S corporation had three shareholders. Because of a
misunderstanding of the regulations, the corporation made
distributions to the shareholders based on cumulative
earnings allocated to the shareholders instead of the correct
allocation based on stock ownership. The corporation
equalized the distributions to comply with the regulations.
The IRS ruled that the temporary incorrect allocations did
not create a second class of stock. Ltr. Rul. 9519048, Feb.
14, 1995.
LABOR
SUCCESSOR CORPORATION. The plaintiff was a
corporation engaged in the production, processing and
transportation of poultry. A controlling interest of stock of
the corporation was purchased by another corporation. Both
corporations were found to have violated 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) for the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain
with a union selected by a majority of the plaintiff's
workers. The purchasing corporation argued that it was not
liable for the violations as a mere shareholder. The court
held that the purchasing corporation became a successor to
the plaintiff when it acquired a controlling interest in the
plaintiff and continued the business of the plaintiff
substantially unchanged. Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 48
F.3d 1360 (4th Cir. 1995).
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